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INTRODUCTION 
Solomon Linda was born in 1909 in South Africa, and grew up 
in Ladysmith, Zululand, a region located in South Africa.1  He 
“never learned to read or write.”2  He did, however, know how to 
sing in a high soprano voice,3 and after a childhood of singing with 
friends,4 he began singing to the local black workforce at various 
hostels and beer halls on the weekends.5  Linda’s style, which later 
became known as Mbube, a soprano voice sung over four-part 
harmonies, became extremely popular and widely imitated.6 
In 1939, Linda recorded his locally popular song titled Mbube, 
the Zulu word for “lion,” which was inspired by his childhood as a 
cattle herder in the untamed hinterlands.7  The song was a huge 
hit.8  Mbube sold approximately 100,000 copies, and Solomon 
Linda became a household name in South Africa.9 
 
1 Independent Lens, A Lion’s Trail,  http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/ 
lionstrail/trail.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009)     [hereinafter A Lion’s Trail]. 
 2 Sharon LaFraniere, In the Jungle, the Unjust Jungle, a Small Victory, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/international/ 
africa/22lion.html?r=1&scp=3&sq=solomon%20linda&st=cse. 
 3 Id. 
 4 A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1. 
 5 LaFraniere, supra note 2. 
 6 See id.; see also A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1.  Mbube later transitioned into another 
style of Zulu a capella singing known as isicathamiya, which is characterized by a 
harmonious blend of voices and embodied most famously today by Ladysmith Black 
Mambazo. See Wikipedia, Isicathamiya, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isicathamiya (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2009). 
 7 See A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1; see also Rian Malan, In the Jungle, ROLLING 
STONE, May 25, 2000, at 54 (“It was a simple three-chord ditty with lyrics something 
along the lines of ‘Lion! Ha! You’re a lion!’ inspired by an incident in the Birds’ 
collective Zulu boyhood when they chased lions that were stalking their fathers’ cattle.”). 
 8 See A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1.  To hear a sample of the 1939 recording, along 
with dozens of cover versions of the song, see YouTube, MBUBE,     
http://www.youtube.com/user/FLORENCOM (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
 9 See Malan, supra note 7.  Malan wrote: 
In the jungle, the mighty jungle, the lion sleeps tonight.  Griffith 
Motsieloa must have realized he’d captured something special, 
because that chunk of beeswax was shipped all the way to England 
and shipped back in the form of ten-inch 78-rpm records, which went 
on sale just as Hitler invaded Poland.  Marketing was tricky, because 
there was hardly any black radio in 1939, but the song went out on 
“the re-diffusion,” a land line that pumped music, news and “native 
affairs” propaganda into black neighborhoods, and people began 
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Soon after, American folk singer Pete Seeger discovered the 
song and, after mispronouncing the main refrain, covered it with 
his band, The Weavers, calling it Wimoweh10—and all with 
negligible compensation to Linda.11  There followed several 
different cover versions by different groups;12 in 1961, American 
songwriter George Weiss took Linda’s melody and added the 
lyrics, “In the jungle, the mighty jungle.”13 
Weiss was “[a] civilized chap with a Juilliard degree, [and] he 
didn’t much like the primitive wailing,” but he recognized the 
enormous potential in Linda’s catchy refrain14 and dismantled 
Wimoweh to create his masterpiece.15  In Weiss’s version, “[t]he 
chant remained unchanged, but the melody—Solomon Linda’s 
miracle melody—moved to center stage, becoming the tune itself, 
to which the new words were sung: ‘In the jungle, the mighty 
jungle.’”16  This version was recorded by The Tokens and became 
a world-wide hit.17 
 
trickling into stores to ask for it.  The trickle grew into a steady 
stream that just rolled on for years and years, necessitating so many 
re-pressings that the master disintegrated.  By 1948, “Mbube” had 
sold in the region of 100,000 copies, and Solomon Linda was the 
undefeated and undefeatable champion of hostel singing competitions 
and a superstar in the world of Zulu migrants. 
Id. 
 10 See id. (“[H]e got out pen and paper and started transcribing the song, but he 
couldn’t catch the words through all the hissing on the disc.  The Zulus were chanting, 
‘Uyimbube, uyimbube,’ but to Pete it sounded like awimboowee, or maybe awimoweh, 
so that’s how he wrote it down.”). 
 11 See A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1. 
 12 See, e.g., Malan, supra note 7 (“‘Wimoweh’ lived on, bewitching jazz ace Jimmy 
Dorsey, who covered it in 1952, and the sultry Yma Sumac, whose cocktail-lounge 
version caused a minor stir a few years later.  Toward the end of the decade, it was 
included on Live From the Hungry I, a monstrously popular LP by the Kingston Trio that 
stayed on the charts for more than three years (178 weeks), peaking at Number Two.  By 
now, almost everyone in America knew the basic refrain . . . .”). 
 13 A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1; Malan, supra note 7 (“George Weiss took ‘Wimoweh’ 
home with him and gave it a careful listen . . . . [E]veryone agrees . . . that: ‘The Lion 
Sleeps Tonight’ was a reworking of ‘Wimoweh,’ which was a copy of ‘Mbube.’  
Solomon Linda was buried under several layers of pop-rock stylings, but you could still 
see him beneath the new song’s slick surface . . . .”). 
 14 Malan, supra note 7. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1; see also Malan, supra note 7.  Malan wrote: 
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Mbube and its subsequent covers were so popular that 
approximately “[one hundred and fifty] artists eventually recorded 
the song.”18  It was “translated into languages from Dutch to 
Japanese,” and was featured “in more than [thirteen] movies.”19  
Linda “should have been a rich man.”20  Instead, he lived in a hut 
in the Soweto section of Johannesburg with no furniture, “sleeping 
on a dirt floor carpeted with cow dung.”21  His payment?  In 1952, 
upon signing over the rights to the company that produced his 
record, “Linda received ten shillings—about eighty-seven cents 
today.”22  He “also got a job sweeping floors and serving tea in the 
company’s packing house.”23  In 1962, the same year that The 
Tokens’ The Lion Sleeps Tonight became an international number 
one hit, a desperately impoverished Solomon Linda died from 
 
The song broke out regionally, hit the national charts in 
November and reached Number One in four giant strides. 
Within a month, a cover by someone named Karl Denver 
reached Number One in England, too.  By April 1962 it was topping 
the charts almost everywhere and heading for immortality.  Miriam 
Makeba sang her version at JFK’s last birthday party, moments 
before Marilyn Monroe famously lisped, “Happy birthday, Mr. 
President.”  Apollo astronauts listened to it on the launchpads at Cape 
Canaveral, Florida.  It was covered by the Springfields, the Spinners, 
the Tremeloes and Glen Campbell.  In 1972 it returned to the charts, 
at Number Three, in a version by Robert John.  Brian Eno recorded it 
a few years later. 
In 1982 it was back at Number One in the U.K., this time 
performed by Tight Fit.  R.E.M. did it, as did the Nylons and They 
Might Be Giants.  Manu Dibango did a twist version.  Some Germans 
turned it into heavy metal.  A sample cropped up on a rap epic titled 
“Mash Up da Nation.”  Disney used the song in The Lion King, and 
then it got into the smash-hit theatrical production of the same title, 
currently playing to packed houses around the world.  It’s on the 
original Broadway cast recording, on dozens of kiddie CDs with 
cuddly lions on their covers and on an infinite variety of nostalgia 
compilations.  It’s more than sixty years old, and still it’s everywhere. 
Id.  To hear a clip from The Tokens’ The Lion Sleeps Tonight, see Wikipedia, The Lion 
Sleeps Tonight, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Lion_Sleeps_Tonight (last visited Oct. 
21, 2009). 
 18 LaFraniere, supra note 2. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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kidney disease at the age of fifty-three with less than twenty-five 
dollars to his name.24 
Solomon Linda’s story is just one example of Western 
exploitation of traditional African music.  The issue of protecting 
traditional musical expressions in Africa encompasses much of the 
cultural debate in the international community.25  Protecting 
traditional African songs under statutory-only copyright schemes 
has benefits, but more often than not, as exemplified in the case of 
Solomon Linda, a purely statutory scheme is desperately 
inadequate to protect the rights of traditional African songwriters 
and performers.26  The Western and African traditions are 
incompatible at a very basic level, and a system that would mesh 
the two would be unfair and possibly destructive to traditional 
African communities.27 
This Note explores the protections given to traditional African 
musicians and to the songs themselves under two very different 
schemes: customary law and Western statutory law.  In Part I, the 
basic structure of both Western copyright and customary law 
systems is explained; this part also contains a cursory explanation 
of how customary law functions within Western courts set up 
under the colonial system.  The statutory schemes available in 
different African countries, as well as several proposed 
international solutions, are also explored in Part I.  Part II discusses 
the problems arising under customary law and statutory schemes, 
respectively, when copyright of traditional music is the issue at 
hand.  Part III proposes a first-step solution to the problem of 
protecting traditional songs and the musicians who perform them 
by way of streamlining the court system and increasing judges’ 
education. 
 
 24 Id.; A Lion’s Trail, supra note 1. 
 25 See generally Michael Blakeney, Protecting Traditional Cultural Expressions: The 
International Dimension, in 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 3 (Fiona Macmillan 
& Kathy Bowrey eds., 2006); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern 
Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and 
Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 773–74 
(1999). 
 26 See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 791–94. 
 27 See infra notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
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The solution would employ greater education for judges, an 
expansion of the customary law judicial system within the statute-
created court system, and deference to the customary laws of 
particular jurisdictions.  The only way to achieve equality between 
the customary law system and the statutory system is to recognize 
that customary law is in and of itself a legitimate system worthy of 
judicial enforcement, side-by-side with a statutory scheme. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS: WESTERN VS. AFRICAN 
A. Western Copyright (Statutory-Based Schemes) 
Before comparing Western copyrights with existing African 
customary law, it is necessary to lay out the basic foundations 
that are common to virtually all Western copyright schemes.  It 
is important to keep in mind that this Note deals with the 
relationship between the oft-conflicting statutory and customary 
law systems in Africa; for this reason, African statutory law, 
which comes from the time of European colonization,28 can be 
referred to as a “Western” scheme of law.  In virtually every 
Western scheme, there is a set of doctrines that have a common 
thread: the requirements of fixation and originality, the idea 
that an author owns his own work, and the principle that an idea 
cannot be copyrighted.29 
The fixation requirement, sometimes referred to as the 
tangible form requirement, ensures that the work can be 
perceived from the creation.30  Most Western statutory schemes 
require that a work be fixed in a “definite medium of 
expression,” from which the work can be perceived or known.31  
 
 28 See infra note 98 and text accompanying note 100. 
 29 E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
 30 See id. 
 31 E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(b) (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian 
Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(b) (Nigeria). 
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This requirement is necessary to ensure that the copyright is 
given to a work that is more than fleeting. 
The second requirement, which is notoriously difficult to 
parse, is the requirement of originality.  Virtually all copyright 
statutes require originality.32  The originality requirement 
forces the author to give some minimal degree of creativity (the 
degree to which creativity must be established can differ 
between countries).33 
The third aspect of statutory copyright law that is common 
to most African countries is the way that ownership is 
determined.  Under statutory schemes, ownership of any given 
copyright usually belongs to the author, co-author, or joint 
author of any of the included categories of works.34  The 
statutory schemes do not allow group ownership, although most 
of these countries do allow for works made for hire, whereby 
the commissioning party would own the copyright.35 
Finally, an aspect shared by most Western statutory 
schemes is that an idea cannot be copyrighted.36  Rather, 
copyright applies only to those works whose expressions have 
been made tangible by an original, creative process.37 
 
 32 E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(a) (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian 
Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(a) (Nigeria). 
 33 See Nigerian Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(a) (Nigeria) (noting that 
“sufficient effort” must be expended to ensure the work’s originality). 
 34 E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(1) (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian 
Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 9(1) (Nigeria); South African Copyright Act 125 of 
1992 s. 21(1)(a). 
 35 E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 7 (enacted May 17, 2005) (“In the absence of 
any contract to the contrary, the economic right of a work shall vest in an employer or a 
person who commissions the work where the employed or commissioned author has 
created the work in the course of the employment or commission.” (emphasis added)); 
Nigerian Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 9(3) (Nigeria). 
 36 E.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 2 (enacted May 17, 2005) (“Copyright shall 
not extend to ideas, concepts, procedures, methods or other things of a similar nature.”); 
Ghana, Copyright Law of 1985, § 3 (enacted Mar. 21, 1985). 
 37 E.g., Nigerian Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(a) (Nigeria); South African 
Copyright Act 125 of 1992 s. 2(1).  Ghana, South Africa and Nigeria have been provided 
as examples but are representative of the various statutory schemes existing in Africa.  To 
avoid cluttering the footnotes with needless repetition, this Note will rely on those 
countries to provide statutory examples. 
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B.  Customary Law and African Culture 
1. Background on Customary Law 
Customary law can be a concept foreign to those trained in the 
Western tradition, and therefore, to understand the traditional 
concept of intellectual property within African traditions, it is 
necessary to provide an overview of the nature and role of musical 
composition as well as the relevant principles of customary law. 
In much of sub-Saharan Africa, most people “belong to tribes 
and have roots in traditional communities, [regardless of] whether 
they live in villages or cities.”38  These traditional roots influence 
much of their day-to-day lives, including particular rituals that may 
be performed.39 
One of the ubiquitous forms of expression common to many 
African cultures is music.40 Musical performance often involves 
“singing, humming, strumming strings, shaking rattles, beating 
drums, or ringing bells and gongs.”41  The line between speech and 
music is indistinct in many performance cultures, and music is 
used for a variety of purposes, including both entertainment and 
conveying information.42  Folksongs are often used in a social 
context to build and enforce socially acceptable character.43 
Music also “serves as a means of recording history by 
preserving information about . . . past events.”44  For example, 
“[i]n the Republic of Benin, there are special songs sung when a 
child cuts [his] first teeth;”45 “among the Hausas of Nigeria, young 
people . . . [use songs] to help them court lovers or insult rivals,”46 
 
 38 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 841. 
 39 See id. at 780. 
 40 See id.; see also Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Coming to Our Senses”: Communication and 
Legal Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873, 893 (1992). 
 41 Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 893 (citing IDISORE OKPEWHO, THE EPIC IN AFRICA 62–63 
(1979)). 
 42 See id.; Kuruk, supra note 25, at 780. 
 43 See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 780 (citing JOHN ROSCOE, THE BAGANDA: AN 
ACCOUNT OF THEIR NATIVE CUSTOMS AND BELIEFS 460 (1965)). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 894 (quoting JOHN M. CHERNOFF, AFRICAN RHYTHM AND 
AFRICAN SENSIBILITY 34 (1979)). 
 46 Id. (quoting CHERNOFF, supra note 45, at 34). 
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and “men working in a field may . . . appoint some of their number 
to work by making music instead of [farming];”47 and “among the 
Hutus, men paddling a canoe will sing a different song depending 
on whether they are going with or against the current.”48 
Although some practices, to be discussed later,49 are quite 
different from the Western intellectual property tradition as 
exemplified in statutory schemes, African customary law does 
afford some degree of protection for intellectual property rights.50  
For example, only certain people are allowed to perform some 
musical rites, use certain instruments, or sing certain songs; very 
specific rules “govern who can . . . play certain musical 
instruments, and at what time and for what reasons they are 
played.”51  In fact, “the absence of a modern intellectual property 
system” does not prevent an individual from seeking protection;52 
protection is not achieved with a formal system, but rather, through 
a universal understanding of social norms.53  At the very basic 
level, intellectual property rights are protected by traditional 
 
 47 Id. (quoting CHERNOFF, supra note 45, at 34). 
 48 Id. (quoting CHERNOFF, supra note 45, at 34); see also LEONARD W. DOOB, 
COMMUNICATION IN AFRICA: A SEARCH FOR BOUNDARIES 79 (1961).  For a further 
discussion of the culture and specific examples of the practices of Nigerians, see SABURI 
OLADENI BIOBAKU, A WINDOW ON NIGERIA 19–29 (1994). 
 49 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 50 Johanna Gibson, Community and the Exhaustion of Culture: Creative Territories in 
Traditional Cultural Expressions, in 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 15, 22 (Fiona 
Macmillan & Kathy Bowrey eds., 2007). 
 51 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 784 (citing ROSCOE, supra note 43, at 189).  Further 
discussing these rules, Kuruk wrote: 
[T]he great national drums of the Lozi which are beaten only for war, 
or in national emergencies, are under the watchful eye of a special 
council of elders. Each Baganda king in Uganda has a select group of 
drummers who play special drums to ensure the permanency of his 
office.  Among the Bahima of Uganda, only women keep harps, 
which they use at home.  Among the Baganda, fifes are owned and 
played mainly by herd boys.  In Nigeria, certain musical instruments 
are dedicated to particular cults. 
Id. 
 52 BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING: GATT, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 42, 47 (1997). 
 53 See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 780–81. 
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African tribal members’ deference to the customs and traditions of 
their respective groups.54 
Individuals living within traditional tribes have historically 
enforced these rights in a variety of ways.55  Two kinds of laws 
generally govern this area: royal decrees and taboos.56  The king, 
who is regarded as a “sacred person[] representing the gods of the 
people of the earth,” makes royal decrees,57 which carry the force 
of secular law, albeit with a certain magical undertone.58  The 
kings or chiefs have “moral and ritual authority based on a 
perceived mystical association with the tribes’ ancestors.”59 
These “rights are recognized under social criteria depending 
upon the degree of the kinship, age, sex, title, or role of individuals 
in the society . . . .”60  The norms are quite strictly enforced: it is 
inconceivable that anyone outside the socially acceptable group 
having these rights would engage in singing its songs.61  This is 
particularly true of different age groups: “members of an age group 
would never sing the songs . . . of another age group.”62  These 
norms are enforced by sanctions based on common interests.63  
Sanctions, which are “often determined by the leaders of the 
constituent groups, can range from censure, to fines, to ostracism, 
or even expulsion from the group.”64 
 
 54 Id. at 782–84. 
 55 See SODIPO, supra note 52, at 42. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 781. 
 59 Id. at 781–82 (citing ELIZABETH COLSON & MAX GLUCKMAN, SEVEN TRIBES OF 
BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA 169 (1968)). 
 60 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 780–81. 
 61 See SODIPO, supra note 52, at 44, 46. 
 62 Id. at 44. 
 63 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 785. 
 64 Id. at 786. See generally SODIPO, supra note 52, at 43–44 (“The breach of a tradition 
could be punished by the head of the family, or clan, or by members of an age group.  
Erring members could be disciplined by the head of the larger family, who might order a 
fine of items like local gin, goats, etc., or a sacrifice.  Pressure would be brought to bear 
on any offender who failed to pay his fine or who repeated the offen[s]e.  His wife would 
plead with him to avoid the long-term repercussions (bad luck) which would ensue for his 
immediate family.  The offender’s wife would be coerced by members of her original 
larger family to press her husband to conform.  Other members of the larger family might 
also coerce an offender into paying his fines, to avoid repercussions on their family.  
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Royal decrees and taboos are related forms; the royal decrees, 
made by a human king, often can be supported or carried out by 
magical or spiritual consequences, known as taboos.65  Taboos are 
superstitious beliefs that “certain objects and persons are set aside 
as sacred or accursed.”66  Because cultural norms are engendered 
with mystical connotations,67 failure to observe these norms 
“brings the anger and curses of the gods against the offender or 
even against the whole community,”68 and accordingly, a taboo 
will be placed on the offender or the whole community.69  Taboos 
can result in severe penalties.70 
Tribal intellectual property rights are absolutely binding; the 
sanction for violating these rights often takes the form of magical 
or spiritual punishments by tribal ancestors.71  These sanctions 
derive their enforcement power from “the common ritual 
dependence of members of the lineage on their ancestors.”72  If 
tribal rights are violated, it is believed that the gods will enforce 
these rights.73  Therefore, even though a Western statutory scheme 
is not in place in a way that can be easily enforced by tribal 
members, traditional African tribes still afford some degree of 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
 
Further disobedience could lead to the family being ostracized by the larger family, or by 
the entire community.  This was often the worst kind of punishment.  The community 
would not buy from him or sell to him or members of his immediate family.  If he was 
still obdurate (depending on the offen[s]e), he could either be banished from the 
community or he would leave of his own accord because he would not be able to bear the 
shame.  Such exit usually must be for a distant community—neighbo[]ring communities 
would probably know that the newcomer was an offender from another community.  He 
would then be seen either as bringing ill luck, or as a danger to the new community since 
he might be disobedient and cause an upset in the new community.”). 
 65 See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 785–86. 
 66 Id. at 849 n.112 (quoting MASON BEGHO, LAW AND CULTURE IN THE NIGERIAN AND 
ROMAN WORLD 99 (1971)). 
 67 Id. at 785. 
 68 Id. at 849 n.112 (quoting  BEGHO, supra note 66, at 99). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 785–86. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 785. 
 73 Id. at 785–86, 849 n.112. 
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2. Differences Between African and Western IP Ideology 
Although customary norms provide a certain degree of IP 
protection, there are, of course, major differences between African 
and Western traditions, particularly with regard to the form, 
purpose, and ownership of the music itself.74  For example, 
traditional African songs are often not fixed in tangible form, 
instead remaining ephemeral, fleeting, and in a constant state of 
change.75  These songs are still protected under a system of social 
norms and magical beliefs.76 
Another major difference is that the purpose of cultural 
property in African society is different than in Western music.77  
Aside from its value as entertainment: 
Music serve[s] as a medium for recording 
history . . . play[s] a vital role in rituals and 
festivities . . . serve[s] as a medium for communing 
with dead ancestors and spirits; as a palliative in 
healing mental or physical illnesses by preparing 
the mind for healing acts; to provoke riots, or 
prepare for fights and battles; and as social 
commentary, to criticize or check abuse of 
government.78 
At the heart of this difference is that the intent of the African 
creator departs from a Western ideal.79  To Africans, the value of 
music cannot simply be commoditization—buying and selling in 
the marketplace.80  As has previously been discussed, the intent of 
creating music may not be for the pure enjoyment of the music 
itself, but rather, to serve a specific societal purpose.81 
 
 74 See infra notes 75–87 and accompanying text. 
 75 See Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 951. 
 76 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 77 See Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 893. 
 78 SODIPO, supra note 52, at 38; see also BIOBAKU, supra note 48, at 22  (“The songs, 
ancient and modern, are rich in their use of language; they weave social events, long ago 
and of today, in their lyrics . . . .”). 
 79 See Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 894. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. (“In [N]orth African Siwan society, for instance, the air may be filled with 
the ritual wailing of bereaved relatives.  This is not an immature ‘noise,’ an aural 
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Another major difference between customary law and Western 
IP schemes is that, under customary law, ownership of traditional 
practices, including music, “refers to the rights of all members of 
the community in subject-matter originally acquired by ancestors 
which cannot be transferred unilaterally by any member of the 
group.”82  There is no real Western corollary to the group 
ownership that exists in African tribes; this idea that there is ‘“an 
intermediary sphere of intellectual property rights between 
individual rights and the . . . public domain’”83 is simply foreign to 
the Western tradition.84  Within traditional communities, however, 
it makes perfect sense: 
[T]raditional communities inhere in the prior 
stability of ancestral tradition, and the responsibility 
to narrate tradition and therefore maintain the 
“self”-expression of community according to shared 
“values”. This tradition may not be personali[z]ed 
or “owned” as such, but must be expressed and 
maintained. 
It is this responsibility to tradition that founds 
the legitimacy of community resources . . . .85 
Responsibility to tradition makes property communal, or at the 
very least, “resistant to quantification;” this is achieved by social 
context where the tribe’s common belief in the pervasion of the 
 
nuisance, or an inconvenience.  It is, instead, a useful manner of communicating a death 
over a wide geographic area.”). 
 82 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 794; see Joost Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights: Better 
for Artists, Third World Countries and the Public Domain, in COPYRIGHT IN THE 
CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 119, 128 (Ruth Towse ed., 2002) [hereinafter Smiers, The 
Abolition of Copyrights]. 
 83 Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 128. 
 84 There are, of course, quasi-indigenous groups based in the Western tradition who 
may have a similar problem with the intellectual property rights of their ever-changing 
cultural property. See generally id. at 126–29. Additionally, there are groups around the 
world whose intellectual property differences mirror those of the African tribes. See id. at 
126–28.  However, the scope of this Note is limited to the issues surrounding the IP 
problems in African tribal music. 
 85 Gibson, supra note 50, at 19. 
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sacred or the spiritual extends to all members of the community.86  
Cultural expression is considered a community resource; it is, at a 
very basic level, a rejection of the idea of the separation of 
community and its resources.87 
This collective ownership derives from a different musical 
aesthetic.  In traditional societies, ‘“the responsibility for a 
narrative is never assumed by a person, but by a mediator, shaman 
or relater whose ‘performance’—the mastery of the narrative 
code—may possibly be admired but never his ‘genius.’”88  Only in 
the modern Western tradition is an author accorded individual 
prestige rather than crediting the group as a whole.89  This Western 
idea is best summed up in the words of James Fenimore Cooper: 
“All greatness of character is depend[e]nt on individuality.  The 
man who has no other existence than that which he partakes in 
common with all around him, will never have any other than an 
existence of mediocrity.”90 
However, in many parts of the world, music and other artistic 
creations belong to a process of changing and adapting, and thus 
belong to the commons.91  In Africa, even the process of creating 
music is not done by a single individual, but rather, is shared by 
the community as a whole.92  This is seen as a community-building 
and strengthening exercise which is vital to the very structure of 
the tribe itself.93 
 
 86 Peter Fitzpatrick & Richard Joyce, Copying Right: Cultural Property and the Limits 
of (Occidental) Law, in 4 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 171, 175 (Fiona 
Macmillan ed., 2007). 
 87 See Gibson, supra note 50, at 29–32. 
 88 Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 124 (quoting K.M. NEWTON, 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERARY THEORY: A READER 155 (1988)). 
 89 See id. (citing NEWTON, supra note 88, at 155). 
 90 JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT & OTHER POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 488 (Bradley J. Birzer & John Wilson eds., 2000). 
 91 See Joost Smiers, Creative Improper Property: Copyright and the Non-Western 
World, in 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 13 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2005) 
[hereinafter Smiers, Creative Improper Property]. 
 92 Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 128 (‘“[I]n African 
performing arts the audiences often have a creative role too, as they chant, clap and 
perform dance-dialogues with the musicians.’”). 
 93 See African Activists Take the Stage at New York Performance Summit, N.Y. 
AMSTERDAM NEWS, Oct. 27, 2005, at 20. 
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It is important to note, however, that the members of the 
community (or subgroup within the community) who create 
traditional music do not have particular enforceable rights vis-à-vis 
outsiders.94  For example, a Western intruder who wrongfully 
appropriated tribal music would be unaffected by the royal decrees 
or taboos, and thus, would have no incentive to follow those 
societal traditions.  While there are socially enforceable rules 
governing the rights of members of the tribe against each other 
(insiders against insiders), there are no enforceable customary laws 
that protect members of the tribe against nonmember appropriation 
of tribal music (insiders against outsiders).95  These outsiders can, 
and often do, appropriate traditional music without fear of 
retribution.96 
3. Customary Law in the Courts 
In order to understand the root of the issue this Note seeks to 
explore, it is necessary to briefly describe how the customary law 
system functions within the Western-style court system in most 
African countries.97 
Most African countries did not recognize customary law as a 
legitimate legal system until very recently.98  Before that, countries 
 
 94 See Gibson, supra note 50, at 32. 
 95 This is because, quite simply, a Western-thinking individual would not believe in the 
taboos and royal decrees that bind traditional African peoples.  An atheist does not fear 
the wrath of God because he does not believe in a higher power, but a religious person 
would have that deity-based fear in his heart.  Such is the case with Westerners and 
African tribes. See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 786–87. 
 96 See infra Part II.A. 
 97 There are customary law courts that deal specifically and only with customary law, 
but for the purposes of this section, only Western-style courts will be discussed, as they 
would be the courts hearing copyright cases with Westerners.  The legal authority of 
these courts was solidified in the case of Mdumane v. Mtshakule, 1948 N.A.C 28 (C&O) 
(Bizana) (S. Afr.). D.S. Koyana, Traditional Courts in the 21st Century 2 (Leitner Center 
for Int’l Law & Justice).  Furthermore, “[t]raditional courts are not courts of record as 
such.  All proceedings are conducted orally in the language most widely spoken in the 
area of jurisdiction of the court.” Id. at 7. 
 98 See, e.g., T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 34 (2004) (“Until the 
advent of a new constitution in 1993, customary law had never been fully recognized as a 
basic component of the South African legal system. Instead, Roman-Dutch law was 
treated as the common law of the land.”).  In 1988, South Africa promulgated the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act, which “made customary law applicable in any court in the 
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like South Africa stated that the courts “could apply customary 
law, except in so far as it was ‘not repugnant to the general 
principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized world.’”99  
In the early twentieth century, many traditional courts, which 
applied customary law, were subordinate to commissioners’ courts, 
which applied Western colonial law; this meant that Westerners 
could hear appeals from customary law disputes.100 
Today, African courts may apply either Western law or 
customary law, depending upon the facts of the case before the 
court.101 
C. Statutory Protections: African and International 
Many African states have adopted national intellectual property 
schemes that attempt to accommodate traditional African 
conceptions of intellectual property in addition to Western 
statutory schemes.102  Additionally, there are several international 
approaches which have been developed to accommodate 
internationally differing conceptions of intellectual property.103  
This section reviews such schemes.104 
 
country.” Id. at 42.  This obligation to apply customary law where necessary is qualified 
by three restrictions: “that customary law is ‘applicable,’ that it is compatible with the 
Constitution and that it has not been superseded by ‘any legislation that specifically deals 
with customary law.’” Id. at 43. 
 99 Id. at 38. 
 100 See id. at 40. 
 101 Id. at 49–51. 
 102 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 103 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 104 It is important to keep in mind that when speaking of African tradition from a 
Western perspective, it is inherently a view of primal fixitythe idea of the primitive 
who must be protected from the invasiveness of the Western world. See Fitzpatrick & 
Joyce, supra note 86, at 175.  Essentially, when we speak about primal fixity, it is the 
idea that the African tribe member has always performed his custom in the manner in 
which the Westerner presently observes. See id.  However, this is likely not the case 
because African traditions are so fluid and constantly change over time. See id. at 174.  
Therefore, the view of African traditions must necessarily be a paternalistic one if viewed 
from the Western perspective. See id. at 174–75.  Primal fixity is a concept which 
controls much of how Westerners view copyright protections; it is inherently rooted in 
Western individualism and centers around the idea that once something is created, it 
exists forever and does not changehence the aforementioned view of African culture as 
fixed in a certain, ever-present and always repeated tradition. See id.  The concept of a 
changing, living, and breathing African musical culture cannot fit into a view of primal 
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The Western tradition dictates that every artist who has created 
or performed something must take care to protect his work from 
wrongful misappropriation and must take care that the work will 
demonstrably receive copyright status after the creation or 
performance.105  Indeed, in multilateral agreements like TRIPs106 
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, from the World Trade Organization), “poor and developing 
countries have been pushed” to introduce a system of intellectual 
property that would offer individuals copyright protection in 
cultural works.107 
1. International Schemes 
Cultural identity is protected in Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.108  Additionally, the 
 
fixity, and therefore, it must be subordinate to the Western view. See generally IP 
JUSTICE, IP JUSTICE POLICY PAPER FOR THE WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2005), 
http://ipjustice.org/WIPO/WIPO_DA_IP_Justice_Policy_Paper.shtml (“IP systems need 
to take into account different levels of national development to ensure that the underlying 
policies that IP seeks to promote are ultimately met.  Both developed and developing 
countries support this proposition, but some developed countries try to impose a 
particular view of intellectual property on all, while disregarding history in which today’s 
‘rich’ countries became wealthy to a certain extent by refusing to recognize intellectual 
property and by granting wider exceptions and limitations to copyright.”). 
 105 See Gibson, supra note 50, at 21. 
 106 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 40, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
33 I.L.M. 1197, 1213 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 107 See Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 5.  For example, the 
TRIPS Agreement speaks directly to individual ownership; however, it leaves out any 
mention of group ownership. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 104, at art. 16.  This is a 
concept being foisted upon poor and developing countries that may not have as 
sophisticated an IP system as Western countries. See Smiers, Creative Improper 
Property, supra note 91, at 5.  This causes the developing countries to try to conform 
their wealth of intellectual property to a Western system that may not be the best fit. Id.; 
see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 104, at art. 13 (“Members shall confine limitations or 
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
right holder.”). 
 108 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Yvonne Mokgoro, The Protection of Cultural 
Identity in the Constitution and the Creation of National Unity in South Africa: A 
Contradiction in Terms?, 52 SMU L. REV. 1549, 1550 (1999) (“‘[P]ersons belonging to . 
. . minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their 
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Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”), held in 1952 by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”), “provided that the existence of a copyright notice 
was sufficient of subsistence of copyright in member states.”109 
The UCC protection, however, pre-supposed that there was 
copyright protection in the first country in order to transfer that 
right across international borders.110  Quite obviously, if the 
country of origin does not give copyright protection to the author 
originally, then there will be no copyright protections to transfer to 
a new country.111  The UCC was an attempt to broaden the 
international protections of copyright, but kept mainly to a 
statutory scheme because “copyright notice” does not exist in 
customary law in the traditional sense.112 
In 1985, UNESCO and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) adopted a resolution based on the Model 
Provisions for National Law on the Protection of Expressions of 
Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial 
Action,113 promulgated by the Committee of Governmental Experts 
on the Intellectual Property Aspects of the Protection of 
Expressions of Folklore (convened in 1980).114  The Model 
Provisions use the terms “expressions” or “productions” instead of 
“works” as a distinction between its protection of folk songs and 
ordinary copyright laws.115  The Provisions protect “‘characteristic 
 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practi[c]e their own religion, or to use 
their own language.’” (quoting ICCPR, supra, at art. 27)).  Mokgoro notes that “South 
Africa is a signatory to this Covenant.” Mokgoro, supra, at 1561 n.7. 
 109 SODIPO, supra note 52, at 22. 
 110 See id. at 22–23. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. at 21–22.  Copyright notice is a Western tradition; in African tribes, because 
of the group ownership dynamic, there is no need to notify anyone of the existence of an 
individual right.  When something is created, it belongs to the whole group, albeit 
restricted to the appropriate age, rank, class, etc. See supra Part I.B. 
 113 Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore 
Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions, WIPO & UNESCO (1985), 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/documents/pdf/1982-folklore-model-provisions.pdf 
[hereinafter Model Provisions]. 
 114 Blakeney, supra note 25, at 5. 
 115 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 815 (citing Farhana Yamin & Darrell Addison Posey, 
Indigenous Peoples, Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Rights, 2 REV. EUR. 
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elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed and 
maintained by a community.’”116  Protection exists whether the art 
“is expressed verbally, musically, by action, or in tangible 
form.”117 
The Model Provisions were another attempt to broaden 
copyright protections by defining a new class of community 
artistic works subsumed under the heading of folklore.  There are 
two problems with the Model Provisions, however.  First, they 
“avoid the concept of ownership.”118 The Model Provisions offer 
protection only to those “productions consisting of characteristic 
elements of the traditional artistic heritage developed and 
maintained by a community of (name of the country) or by 
individuals reflecting the traditional artistic expectations of such a 
community,”119 a concept which offers no concrete idea of who 
might actually be the owner of any work.  Second, the Model 
Provisions’ useful features are legally and practically insignificant 
because they have not been adopted by any country.120 
In 2001, UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity,121 which states that “culture should be regarded 
as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group, and that it 
encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of 
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”122  The 
Declaration puts a particular emphasis on the diversity of creative 
 
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 141, 145 (1993)); see Model Provisions, supra note 113, 
§ 2. 
 116 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 815 (quoting Model Provisions, supra note 113, § 2). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See Model Provisions, supra note 113, § 2. 
 120 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 817 (citing Darrell Addison Posey, International 
Agreements and Intellectual Property Right Protection for Indigenous Peoples, in 3–4 
IPR: A CURRENT SURVEY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: 
A SOURCEBOOK 223, 231 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994)). 
 121 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Doc. 31C/Res 25, 
Annex 1 (Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/ 
127160m.pdf [hereinafter UNESCO Declaration]. 
 122 Id. at pmbl. 
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works, and urges that the rights of artists should be respected;123 it 
also states that cultural goods and services have “vectors of 
identity, values, and meaning” and must not be treated as mere 
commodities or consumer goods.124 
The Declaration goes on to state that “cultural policies must 
create conditions conducive to the production and dissemination of 
diversified cultural goods and services through cultural industries 
that have the means to assert themselves at the local and global 
level,”125 but it does not lay out any specific guidelines for how 
each state should define its cultural policy,126 instead leaving it to 
the individual country to implement its own policies through 
whatever “means it considers fit.”127  These guidelines serve to 
promote cultural diversity and to encourage states to be more 
inclusive in their own statutory schemes, rather than promoting one 
type of scheme over another.128  The Declaration is an attempt to 
garner acceptance for cultural intellectual property forms and to 
afford them the same protection given to traditional Western forms 
of culture.129 
2. National Schemes 
A brief discussion of individual African countries’ schemes for 
copyright protection reveals an effort by African states to 
accommodate both traditional conceptions of property in music 
and Western intellectual property protection.130  For example, in 
South Africa, the Bill of Rights “recogni[z]es that people 
belonging to a cultural . . . community may not be denied the right 
to enjoy their culture . . . .”131  The South African Bill of Rights 
 
 123 Id. at art. 9 (“While ensuring the free circulation of ideas and works, cultural 
policies must create conditions conducive to the production and dissemination of 
diversified cultural goods and services through cultural industries that have the means to 
assert themselves at the local and global level.”). 
 124 Id. at art. 8. 
 125 Id. at art. 9. 
 126 See id. at art. 12. 
 127 Id. at art. 9. 
 128 See id. at Action Plan §§ 16, 18, 19. 
 129 See UNESCO Declaration, supra note 121. 
 130 See infra notes 131–52 and accompanying text. 
 131 Mokgoro, supra note 108, at 1556 (citing S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 30–31). 
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aims to “forge a common value system for a national consensus,” 
presumably to blur the line between customary law and statutory 
law.132  But the South African Constitution itself recognizes the 
“status and role of traditional leadership”133 and states that the 
courts are obligated to apply customary law when applicable.134  
This creates a pluralist system of law, where the law applied in any 
given case may be either customary or statutory.135 
In Nigeria, the Copyright Act protects expressions of 
folklore.136  Additionally, the Act protects music and 
performances.137  The Act offers protection against unauthorized 
“reproduction . . . communication to the public by performance . . . 
[or] adaptations” where the expressions are “made . . . for 
commercial purposes or outside their traditional or customary 
context.”138  Nigeria has a very inclusive scheme for protection of 
traditional music because it attempts to circumvent the problems 
with tangible form and ownership requirements to which many 
other countries rigidly adhere.139  Thus, Nigerian copyright 
protection eschews many of the traditional qualities a work must 
have before protection is allowed.140 
In contrast, Ghana’s scheme makes little effort to get around 
the tangible form and originality requirements that are so 
problematic in traditional tribal culture.141  In Ghana’s Copyright 
Act, which has a much less flexible framework, “the work must be 
original, in writing, or otherwise reduced to material form” to 
 
 132 Id. at 1557. 
 133 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 211(1). 
 134 Id. § 211(3). 
 135 See id. § 211. 
 136 Copyright Act, (1990) Cap. 68, § 28(5) (Nigeria) (“[F]olklore means a group-
oriented and tradition-based creation of groups or individuals reflecting the expectation 
of the community as an adequate expression of its cultural and social identity, its 
standards and values as transmitted orally, by imitation or by other means including—(b) 
folk songs and instrumental folk music . . . .”). 
 137 Id. § 23. 
 138 Id. § 28(1)(a)–(c). 
 139 See id. § 28. 
 140 For a discussion of these qualities, see supra Part I.A. 
 141 See infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. 
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garner copyright protection.142  Ghanaian law also requires that the 
work is created by a citizen or resident of Ghana, if first published 
in Ghana,143 “or if first published outside Ghana, [is] published in 
Ghana within thirty days of its publication outside Ghana.”144  As 
for folklore protection, the copyrights of authors of folklore vest 
“in the [government] as if the [government] were the creator of the 
works.”145 
In most African countries, folklore is seen as part of the 
national heritage.  In Cameroon, “work based on . . . ideas 
borrowed from traditional cultural heritage of the country is 
protected under copyright law.”146  Additionally, “Congolese 
copyright law protects folklore without a time limitation . . . . [and] 
a [special] society known as the ‘Body of Authors’ is responsible 
for collecting royalties, representing the interests of authors, and 
overseeing the use of folklore,”147 as well as giving permission for 
any performance or reproduction.148 
Mali has a similar system, in which “folklore is also considered 
part of the country’s heritage,” and anyone wishing to use a folk 
song for profit must contact the Minister of Arts and Culture.149  
Besides for-profit uses of folklore, all “‘works whose authors are 
unknown, including the songs, legends, dances, and other 
 
 142 Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(a)–(b) (enacted May 17, 2005); see also 
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 788. 
 143 Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(c)(i) (enacted May 17, 2005); see also Kuruk, 
supra note 25, at 788. 
 144 Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(c)(ii) (enacted May 17, 2005); see also 
Kuruk, supra note 25, at 788. 
 145 See Ghana, Copyright Law, (5)(2) (enacted Mar. 21, 1985) amended by Ghana, 
Copyright Act of 2005, § (4)(2) (enacted May 17, 2005). 
 146 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 802 (citing Law No. 82-18 to Regulate Copyright 
(Cameroon) art. 6(c) (1982), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG. 201, 360, 360–61 (1983)); id. at 802 n.242. 
 147 Id. at 800 (citing Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Congo) arts. 16, 68–69 
(1982), reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 201, 
201–02, 244 (1983)). 
 148 Id. (citing Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Congo) art. 18 (1982), 
reprinted in 19 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 201, 202 
(1983)). 
 149 Id. at 801 (quoting Ordinance Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) art. 8 
(July 1, 1977), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 
125, 180, 182 (1980)). 
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manifestations of the common cultural heritage’”150 are placed in 
the public domain and may include folklore; potential users must 
pay a fee.151  Similarly, “[i]n the Central African Republic, the 
Central African Copyright Office must authorize the commercial 
[usage] of folklore.”152 
By placing works in the public domain but leaving control with 
the government, these countries create a central authority from 
which people can gain permission to use copyrighted material.  
This allows for greater access due to the ease with which all parties 
can garner information about ownership and potential use, and 
also, greater protection for the tribes who might not otherwise be 
afforded the respect of having their permission sought. 
II.  INADEQUATE EITHER WAY: ISSUES IN PURE SCHEMES OF LAW 
A. Problems: Copyright Protections Arising Under Customary 
Law 
A number of difficulties arise if a system of exclusively 
customary law is used.  Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, 
extending intellectual property protections outside the tribe is 
practically impossible, given that many of the sanctions imposed 
under customary law for infringement make sense and are a 
deterrent only to members of a particular tribe.153 
 
 150 Id. (quoting Ordinance Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) art. 8 (July 
1, 1977), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 125, 
180, 182 (1980)). 
 151 Id. at 801–02 (citing Ordinance Concerning Literary and Artistic Property (Mali) art. 
8 (July 1, 1977), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 
125, 180, 182 (1980)).  The statute authorizes the Ministers of Arts and Culture and of 
Finance to charge fees for use of works deemed to be in the public domain. Id.  Works 
belonging “to the common cultural heritage,” or public domain, include works by 
unknown authors, owners who waived copyright protection, foreign authors not residing 
in Mali, deceased authors without heirs, and authors whose term of protection has 
expired. Id. 
 152 Id. at 802 (citing Ordinance No. 85-002 on Copyright (Central African Republic) 
arts. 9, 46 (Jan. 5, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG. 158, 160 (1985)). 
 153 Id. at 786–87 (citing SODIPO, supra note 52, at 42). 
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If sanctions are enforced by magical or religious beliefs, they 
obviously only have power over those who subscribe to those 
particular beliefs.154  If those sanctions are enforced by social 
norms, then quite clearly only the members of that social group 
would have the power to enforce those norms; similarly, only 
members of that social group have incentive to avoid sanctions like 
ostracism.155  To members of a particular tribe, these protections 
are internally sufficient because they are reinforced by the very 
social fabric of their tribe.156  These protections are not sufficient 
to protect against the outside world, however, because outsiders 
have no reason to follow these social norms. 
Take, for example, the problem of Solomon Linda, whose 
traditional work was appropriated by more than one outsider.157  
Linda’s work may have been internally protected within his own 
tribe in the Hinterlands, but once outsiders like Pete Seeger and 
George Weiss found his music, they were able to appropriate it 
without fear of retribution by angry tribal spirits. 
A second problem arises with the concept of communal 
ownership of music in African tribes, and this situation is 
exceedingly common in traditional African tribes.158  It is unclear 
exactly which rights this system confers on individuals outside the 
tribe; neither does this system clarify who within the tribe could 
have the power to give rights to individuals outside the group.159  
 
 154 For a discussion of these beliefs, see supra Part I.B.1. 
 155 See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 785–86.  Customary law does not always encompass 
problems associated with folklore: 
Within the groups, there is pressure to recognize and respect the 
rights and privileges associated with folklore in the common interests 
of members of the community.  Inherent in this system, however, is a 
defect that may limit the usefulness of customary law in tackling the 
problems of unauthorized uses.  Since many of the individuals 
engaged in the unauthorized use of folklore are foreigners, they may 
not have the incentive to respect the norms in the interest of the 
general community. 
Id. at 786. 
 156 See id. at 785–86. 
 157 For history and details on this topic, see supra Introduction. 
 158 For a discussion of communal ownership, see supra Part I.B.1. 
 159 See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 126–27 (“[Artists in 
Third World countries] may be highly respected for what they have created.  However, 
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While chiefs or other members of the group may have authority to 
perform the music, it is not clear who would serve as the authority 
to grant permission for other types of use.160  This is a growing 
problem due to a movement toward individualism within the tribes 
themselves.161  Communal ownership creates problems, of course, 
when trying to enforce these intellectual property rights outside of 
the particular tribe.162 
In some tribes, traditional “notions of collective ownership 
have been contaminated by concepts of private ownership and of 
production for profit”163 as tribal members realized there was 
money to be made in cultural industries.164  This movement is 
widespread and affects many countries;165 local artists take a 
melody which originated from the collective tradition and use it 
with the purpose of commercializing and commodifying that 
music.166  These artists claim ownership, which enables exclusion 
of others in rights to those cultural resources.167  It is in this 
transformation from communal to individual that the concept of 
copyright gets introduced because when an individual owns a 
 
there is no concept in many cultures of an individual exploiting a creation or invention 
monopolistically for many decades.”). 
 160 See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 783–87. 
 161 See id. at 787. 
 162 See SODIPO, supra note 52, at 49 (“Property in intangibles in pre-literate societies 
was usually vested in the community as a whole, or the section of the community 
concerned.  This raises the question of the non-recognition of communal property in 
intellectual property by the common and civil law.  Communal onwership [sic] of real 
property is recogni[z]ed in Nigeria.  Unless attention is given by the international 
community to the recognition of communal intellectual property ownership by the 
modern system, similar rights in preliterate societies will be prejudiced.”). 
 163 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 787. 
 164 Id.; cf. Samuel K. B. Asante, Interests in Land in the Customary Law of Ghana—A 
New Appraisal, 74 YALE L.J. 848, 857 (1965) (discussing evolving concepts of 
ownership in response to social and economic changes). 
 165 Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 14 (“Meanwhile, it happens 
more and more in non-Western societies that local artists privately appropriate an artistic 
idea . . . and start to use it for their own commercial interests . . . .  What has been 
described here in a nutshell covers huge social transformations taking place all over the 
world.”). 
 166 Id.  Solomon Linda may be taken as an example of this notion.  In his case, he took a 
traditional song and popularized it outside of his own tribal group, obviously with the 
intent to distribute copies and to make some sort of profit. See supra Introduction. 
 167 Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 14. 
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copyright, he is necessarily owning the right to exclude others 
from using the subject of the copyright.168 
However, it is not entirely clear from whom these individuals 
should be seeking permission to use traditional music.  The 
customary law system is effective in protecting against unfair use 
in the traditional tribal context due to its social enforceability; 
however, the customary system breaks down when individuals 
within the tribe appropriate the music for their own commercial 
use in society outside the tribe.169 
Another problem posed by this scenario is how to tell insiders 
from outsiders.  That is, how to discern who is considered a tribal 
member and who is a non-tribal member for the purposes of 
protecting traditional musical cultural property.  Does an insider 
(i.e., a tribal member) automatically become an outsider when he 
appropriates a traditional song and attempts to use it outside the 
traditional context?  Should that insider be considered as an 
outsider or should he be treated differently than an actual Western 
“outsider?”  Automatically considering a tribal member to be an 
“outsider” once he misappropriates a work is not necessarily an 
undesirable occurrence for purposes of cultural exchange because 
it simplifies the classification of individuals seeking to use tribal 
music, but customary law as it stands does not have any 
protections against it.170 
Additionally, no customary rules exist with regard to non-tribe 
members taking traditional tribal music and using it in a 
commercial setting.171  That is, the customary law does not provide 
 
 168 Id. 
 169 This is, perhaps, due to the fact that the idea of individual gain from the group’s 
property is relatively new. See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 
126–27 (“The individual appropriation of creations and inventions is a concept alien to 
many cultures . . . there is no concept in many cultures of an individual exploiting a 
creation or invention monopolistically for many decades.”). 
 170 This is necessarily true; customary law applies only to those members of the group 
who follow their laws; there are no laws pertaining specifically to non-tribal members, or 
members who break with tradition with no regard for the tribal customs, perhaps because 
the tribes never contemplated that scenario. See Kuruk, supra note 25, at 786–87. 
 171 As has been discussed previously in this Note, Solomon Linda’s case is a good 
example of this; Pete Seeger and George Weiss, among numerous others, appropriated 
Linda’s music and used it to create world-wide hits.  For further discussion, see supra 
Introduction. 
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for rules in a situation like Solomon Linda’s, where a Westerner 
appropriates traditional African music.  While there may be 
statutory schemes in some countries that protect against this, no 
customary scheme has this characteristic, probably because the 
customary law system never contemplated this now increasingly 
common scenario.172  This insider-versus-outsider problem poses a 
significant threat to the safety and integrity of cultural property.173 
Perhaps the most difficult problem that exists in a purely 
customary scheme, however, is that of how non-traditional courts 
should apply customary law.  A cursory definition of customary 
law is helpful, taken from a Ghanaian example: 
Customary law, as comprised in the laws of Ghana, 
consists of rules of law which by custom are 
applicable to particular communities in Ghana, not 
being rules included in the common law under any 
enactment providing for the assimilation of such 
rules of customary law as are suitable for general 
application.174 
 
 172 See Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 14 (“[I]t happens more 
and more in non-Western societies that local artists privately appropriate an artistic idea, 
a melody or a cultural development origination from the collective tradition, and start to 
use it for their own commercial interests.  They pretend it is theirs, which starts the 
process of excluding others of those cultural resources.  In this transformation the concept 
of copyright gets introduced rather quickly.”). 
 173 For a cursory example, see supra Introduction for a discussion on Solomon Linda 
and the perils of producing a popular, traditional song. 
 174 Gordon R. Woodman, Some Realism About Customary Law—The West African 
Experience, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 128, 129 (quoting Interpretation Act (1960), Acts of 
Ghana C.A. 4, § 18(1)(b)); see E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN:  A 
STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 18, 28 (1954) (“A social norm is legal if its 
neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical 
force by an individual or group possession the socially recognized privilege of so acting.” 
(emphasis omitted)). But see Francis Snyder, Customary Law and the Economy, 28 J. 
AFR. L. 34, 35 (1984) (“It was the product of European capital and the colonial state, but 
was subsequently reified as the concept of ‘tradition.’ In this form the precolonial referent 
was explicitly integrated into the ideologies of scholarship and politics. It formed an 
essential part of the conventional contrast between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern,’ 
embodying both evolutionary and political presuppositions. Produced in the particular 
historical circumstances, the notion of customary law was an ideology of colonial 
domination.”). 
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Customary law in most countries takes the form of rules that 
the average person within the culture would regard as binding.175  
What makes customary law binding is that it is “habitually obeyed 
by those subject to it [because] if not fortified by established usage 
it is not law.”176  While established usage may help the courts to 
determine which law to apply, customary law remains uncodified 
in virtually every country where it is in use.177 
While codifying customary law would certainly make its 
application a simpler process for Western courts, some scholars 
have argued that “once custom has been codified or settled by 
judicial decision, its binding force depends on the statute or the 
doctrine of precedent” and it therefore loses the force and 
flexibility of customary law, instead becoming a Western 
creation.178  Others, however, have argued that customary law does 
not exist until a court has acted.179  Nonetheless, regardless of 
which definition of customary law ultimately prevails, it is true 
that a certain degree of error regarding customary law is inevitable 
due to judges’ unfamiliarity with customary law,180 and this error 
is compounded by the ambiguity in customary law.181 
After gaining a basic understanding of what customary law 
means, it is necessary to apply the law.  But this is much more 
difficult than it appears.  The reason that it is particularly difficult 
 
 175 Woodman, supra note 174, at 151. But see BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND 
CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 67 (Greenwood Press Publishers 1984) (1926) (claiming 
that the law of primitive societies is distinguishable from their customs). 
 176 Antony Allott, The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law, in ESSAYS IN 
AFRICAN LAW 72, 89 (1960). 
 177 While there are countries that respect cultural property, there are none that have 
actually gone so far as to codify the customary law. See, e.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 
2005 (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(b) 
(Nigeria). 
 178 Allott, supra note 176, at 89. 
 179 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 82 (1909); JOHN 
SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 41–43 (Glanville Williams ed., 11th ed. 1957). 
 180 See Woodman, supra note 174, at 141. 
 181 Bennett, supra note 98, at 44 (“According to common-law doctrine, rules that are 
considered law may be presented to the courts by way of argument on the basis of 
authoritative texts.  Issues of fact, on the other hand, must be proved by leading evidence.  
The ambiguous nature of customary law accounts, in part, for the strikingly different 
approaches to proof and ascertainment in the two main sections of the South African 
courts.”). 
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to discuss which law to apply in the area of copyright is that there 
is no hard and fast customary law in the area, as is the case in 
customary law marriage, intestate succession, and wills.182  
Statutes in countries that recognize customary law require the 
courts to apply the customary law of the people subject to their 
jurisdiction, where customary law would be appropriate.183  For 
example, in Ghana, ‘“Any question as to the existence or content 
of a rule of customary law is a question of law for the court.’”184  
However, determining which customary law to apply is not as easy 
a task as it might seem. 
Western judges have a particularly difficult role because they 
must straddle the line between applying customary law as it is 
traditionally recognized and applying the customary law as they 
might interpret it from a necessarily Western perspective.185  This 
is because “the law works well only in systems where judges are 
familiar with their sources.”186  “[H]owever, customary law derives 
from the practices of particular communities; these practices differ 
considerably from place to place, and they change constantly over 
time.”187  Because the court is not part of that customary 
community, it “cannot possibly know the law.”188 
Even when these judges apply customary law as tradition 
requires, there still remains a choice of law regarding different 
groups’ traditions as applied to other, similar groups.  For example, 
South Africa has many different systems of customary law.189  The 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act provides: 
 
 182 See infra note 237. 
 183 Woodman, supra note 174, at 128. 
 184 Id. at 139 (quoting Ghana, Courts Act of 1960, § 67 (current version at Courts 
Decree of 1966, § 65)). 
 185 Id. at 143 (“The position of a judge in such a case will be similar to that of the 
lawyer.  If he ignores the law reports, and looks only, for example, to the body of rules 
which the Accra people recognize as obligatory, he will be making a revolutionary break 
with the well established practices of his profession.”). 
 186 Bennett, supra note 98, at 44. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. at 69 (“Implicit in this complex provision is a hierarchy of choice of law 
rules . . . .  [I]f the parties have not agreed on applicable law, the court must apply the law 
of the place where defendant resides . . . .  This rule may cause more problems than it 
solves.”). 
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In any suit or proceedings between Blacks who do 
not belong to the same tribe, the court shall not in 
the absence of any agreement between them with 
regard to the particular system of indigenous law to 
be applied in such suit or proceedings, apply any 
system of indigenous law other than that which is in 
operation at the place where the defendant or 
respondent resides or carries on business or is 
employed, or if two or more different systems are in 
operation at that place (not being within a tribal 
area), the court shall not apply any such system 
unless it is the law of the tribe (if any) to which the 
defendant or respondent belongs.190 
This system creates difficulties arising in a number of 
situations; for example, if the defendant is a resident of one area 
and is employed in another, or if the place of residence is not 
within a “tribal area.”191 
Courts sometimes hold that if a custom was established for one 
ethnic group, it raises a presumption that that custom also exists for 
another group.192  For example, “Nigerian courts have sometimes 
held themselves bound by Ghanaian decisions on customary law, 
although there is no significant ethnic group common to both 
countries.”193  This is quite obviously an area brimming with 
confusion for judges who must apply customary law. 
B. Problems: Under Statutory Schemes 
While statutory schemes attempt to offer copyright protection 
to traditional African music, a host of issues arise.  African 
conceptions of cultural heritage differ from their Western 
counterparts at the most basic level; the Western conception is 
focused on artistic, literary and performing works as creations in 
and of themselves, whereas in Africa, music is within the realm of 
cultural heritage.194  It is “inherently difficult to protect folk[ 
 
 190 Id. (quoting Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 s. 1(3)). 
 191 Id. at 69–70. 
 192 See Woodman, supra note 174, at 139. 
 193 Id. (citing Awodiya v. Apoesho, [1959] N.W.L.R. 221 (Nigeria)). 
 194 Blakeney, supra note 25, at 6–7. 
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music] under modern intellectual property laws which tend to be 
prompted by concerns irrelevant to folk[ music]”195 because 
Western statutory copyright protection simply may not apply to 
traditional music “where the material is deemed [intangible,] 
unoriginal and in the public domain.”196 
First, the tangible form requirement presents a problem; most 
statutory schemes require music to be in some tangible form to be 
protected—either written down or recorded.197  However, much of 
traditional tribal music cannot be written down, as it is ever-
changing and ephemeral.198  In one instant, the music is heard, and 
in the next instant, it vanishes, which creates a fundamental 
problem for protection within statutory schemes.199  Simply put, 
folk songs which would probably qualify under a modern 
copyright system may fail the test of fixation because there is no 
recording of such works.200  It would be impractical to require that 
folk songs be reduced to a tangible form because African tribal 
culture is always changing; thus there is nothing “palpably present 
 
 195 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 776.  Efforts at protecting these rights within Western 
intellectual property frameworks “largely presume the objective to be . . . [defense] 
against misappropriation . . . rather than reali[z]ing positive rights in traditional 
knowledge development and management according to the customary law of the 
community.” Gibson, supra note 50, at 17.  Additionally: 
[T]he system does not recogni[z]e and affirm such rights as rights 
even if it calls them “rights.”  It cannot do so without an unraveling 
of its own miasmic and fragile identity, which would ensue from 
accepting the insistent assertion of right by indigenous peoples. 
Instead, and as part of its self-sustaining, its own delimited 
foundation is projected onto indigenous peoples and it is their law 
and their rights that are found to be spatially and temporally 
contained. 
Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 178. 
 196 Gibson, supra note 50, at 18; see also Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore 
of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 
(1997); B.A. Botkin, Definitions of Folklore, in 1 FUNK AND WAGNALLS STANDARD 
DICTIONARY OF FOLKLORE, MYTHOLOGY AND LEGEND 398, 399 (Maria Leach ed., 1949) 
(discussing purely oral cultures in which folklore is passed through generations without 
ever being fixed or frozen in a particular form). 
 197 See, e.g., Ghana, Copyright Act of 2005, § 1(2)(b) (enacted May 17, 2005); Nigerian 
Copyright Act, (1999) Cap. 68, § 1(2)(b) (Nigeria). 
 198 See Hibbitts, supra note 40, at 951. 
 199 Id. 
 200 SODIPO, supra note 52, at 39. 
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to protect.”201  Traditional Western protection by copyright is 
incompatible with how creativity works in most African 
societies.202 
A second problem arises due to most statutory copyright 
schemes’ requirement that a work be “original” in order to qualify 
for protection.203  A work can only be considered original if it is 
the product of the independent efforts of the author.204  This makes 
the protection of traditional folk songs all the more difficult 
because originality is almost impossible to establish.205 
On a more abstract level, originality within folk music is 
difficult to establish because the performer uses many different 
sources of language, sounds, and rhythms that are part of the 
common heritage.206  In fact, “‘the same theme may know as many 
variations as there are performers.’  The base is shared knowledge, 
which refers less to a repertoire of existing ‘texts’ but more to a 
whole of social signs.”207 
The idea that music must be original to be copyrightable does 
not fit with the African tradition; 208 the idea that the author creates 
 
 201 Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 174 (citing S. Kirsch, Lost Worlds: 
Environmental Disaster, “Culture Loss,” and the Law, in 42/2 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
167 (2001)). 
 202 Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 8 (“Copyright normally 
requires works to be fixed, but such a freezing of cultures is not how creativity works in 
most societies in all corners of the planet.” (citing G. Dutfield, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: ARTICLES ON CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 
AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE 78 (W. Grosheide & J. Brinkhof eds., 2002))).  In fact, 
there is a very real fear “often expressed about the extending of intellectual property 
rights to traditional knowledge, a fear that this extension will uproot traditional and 
intangible resources, reducing them to some determinate form and thus facilitate their 
exploitation and corruption.” Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 174. 
 203 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 796 (citing Ghana, Copyright Law of 1985, § 2(2)(a) 
(enacted Mar. 21, 1985), reprinted in 21 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG. 423, 424 (1985) (legislating that a work is not eligible for copyright unless it 
is original in character)). 
 204 Ghana, Copyright Law of 1985, § 2 (enacted Mar. 21, 1985). 
 205 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 796. 
 206 See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 125. 
 207 Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 6 (quoting B. DAOUDI AND H. 
MILIANI, L’AVENTURE DU RAI. MUSIQUE ET SOCIETE (Paris: Editions du Seuil: 1996)).  
This can be similar to the idea of jazz improvisation, which, similarly, fails the fixation 
test discussed earlier. See supra Part I. 
 208 See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 128. 
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something out of nothing is a Western idea.209  What is closer to 
reality is the concept that “[n]ot one person ever creates out of 
nothing.”210  Each singer, musician, or performer uses cultural 
heritage and adds something to it.211  Trying to force an originality 
requirement on traditional African society is inherently unfair 
because “individuals and communities have rights to maintain their 
own cultural uniqueness” 212 and keep their traditional music safe 
from would-be copyright infringers. 
The third problem with statutory copyright protection is the 
idea that traditional folk songs are not owned by a particular 
individual, but rather, by the group as a whole.213  It is almost 
impossible to recognize the author in the Western sense,214 which 
makes it difficult to apply modern intellectual property 
protections.215 
Even when there is an individual creator, there is no sharp 
divide between the creator of the music and the performer, or the 
dancer who dances to that music, or the audience who listens to it; 
 
 209 See id. at 126. 
 210 Smiers, Creative Improper Property, supra note 91, at 16. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Mokgoro, supra note 108, at 1557. See generally BIOBAKU, supra note 48, at 19 
(describing how traditions and songs are often intermingled between peoples). 
 213 For a discussion of these communal ownership rights, see supra Part I.B.1. See also 
Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 126–27 (“The individual 
appropriation of creations and inventions is a concept alien to many cultures . . . .  
[T]here is no concept in many cultures of an individual exploiting a creation or invention 
monopolistically for many decades.”). 
 214 Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 127; see also Mamie 
Harmon, Definition of Folklore, in FUNK AND WAGNALLS STANDARD DICTIONARY OF 
FOLKLORE, MYTHOLOGY AND LEGEND, 398, 399–400 (Maria Leach ed., 1949) (stating 
that folklore is defined by the ways in which it is transmitted, such that the work of an 
individual can become folklore as it is acquired as the symbol of a group and passed 
through generations); Kuruk, supra note 25, at 796 (“For example, there may be a 
problem identifying an individual who could claim authorship given the passage of 
folklore through generations of people in the community.  It is obvious that while an 
individual may have indeed created a particular work of folklore, it would eventually 
have been acquired and used by the society at large and gradually, with the passage of 
time, have lost its individualistic traits.”); Kamal Puri, Cultural Ownership and 
Intellectual Property Rights Post-Mabo: Putting Ideas into Action, 9 INTELL. PROP. J. 
293, 307–08 (1995) (explaining that Aboriginal folklore derives from complex 
relationships between generations of people and their land). 
 215 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 795. 
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in African society, all of these individuals have ownership over the 
music, whereas Western society usually gives ownership solely to 
the author.216  In the Western tradition, there is a certain 
preoccupation with expression as the means by which to gain 
recognition; this is critical to the “natural justice and economic 
justifications for intellectual property protection.”217  This Western 
perspective is necessarily at odds with communal experiences of 
cultural music because the Western tradition names the author as 
the individual with rights to exclude others, 218 but African tribal 
members all have access to and permission to use the music.219 
A fourth problem arises when copyright protection is to be 
extended over national boundaries.  As demonstrated by the 
enactment of the Berne Convention, the best way to ensure 
adequate protection in all countries may be to extend protection of 
national laws to foreign copyright holders and hope that other 
countries would reciprocate the gesture.220  However, the 
protection schemes tend to disproportionately favor the developed 
countries whose intellectual property laws are already in existence, 
and the underdeveloped countries have to scramble to follow 
suit.221 
 
 216 See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 126–28 and 
accompanying text (“Even when copyrights are applied in many non-Western cultures, it 
soon becomes clear that the ideology sustaining the system is not fit for the complexity of 
the creative process. In the Western world there exists a sharp division between . . . the 
composer and the performer.  This is not the case in African music, which . . . is usually 
associated with specific dances.”). 
 217 Gibson, supra note 50, at 21. 
 218 Id.; see also Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 171 (“Prevalent modes of 
protecting traditional knowledge and culture seek to determine the content of ‘traditional’ 
rights and the identity of their holders.  However . . . such determination is impossible.”). 
 219 See Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 126–28. 
 220 SODIPO, supra note 52, at 20–21. 
 221 Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 129–30 (“The author’s 
concept stands as a gate through which one must pass in order to acquire intellectual 
property rights.  At the moment, this is a gate that tends disproportionately to favo[]r the 
developed countries’ contributions to world science and culture.”) (quoting JAMES 
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 124–28 (1991)).  For a discussion of the issues that can arise in 
situations where there is a conflict of law between two different areas, see supra Part 
I.B.3. 
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III.  RESOLUTION: A NEW DIRECTION FOR CUSTOMARY LAW 
COPYRIGHTS 
Quite simply, “intellectual property” is not the correct regime 
to be implemented if the goal is to offer adequate protections to 
traditional tribal music.222  What is necessary is a new concept 
based on traditional African ideas and social norms.  A system that 
naturally flows and works with the traditional customary law 
would be much more constructive than “trying to make the forms 
of protection fit within a framework which was never designed for 
them and where the existing users and developers of copyright 
notions resist strenuously any such development.”223 
Forcing Western intellectual property forms onto traditional 
African customs can only challenge the form of custom itself,224 
which would serve only to erase an important part of African 
culture.  In truth, the only reason that copyright is seen as an 
appropriate frame of reference to the protection of indigenous 
music is because there is sufficient superficial similarity between 
music of the Western tradition and African tribal music.225  
However, that superficial similarity—that both are auditory 
music—is a ludicrous reason to force a different, Western-style 
creative intent on a completely different form of African art. 
While some would suggest that the “essence of our 
communication as human beings” should be liberated from control 
by corporate holders and allowed to return to the public domain,226 
that line of thinking is dangerous; it leaves African culture open to 
easy abuse and misappropriation.227  It would be much more 
appropriate to view “[t]he object of protection . . . not necessarily 
[as] the resource as an end in itself but the ability of the 
 
 222 Id. at 129. 
 223 Id. (quoting Follow-Up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, COM (1996) 568 final (Nov. 20, 1996)). 
 224 Fitzpatrick & Joyce, supra note 86, at 186. 
 225 Id. at 185. 
 226 Smiers, The Abolition of Copyrights, supra note 82, at 132. 
 227 Much of traditional African music is unprotected even within its own region from 
the greedy eyes of potential misappropriators, which makes the notion of freeing the 
“essence of our communication as human beings” simply unworkable in a practical 
sense. 
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community to continue to function and observe internal 
differentiation and communal integrity through its management 
and deployment of resources.”228  Western society needs to 
approach copyright protection from the viewpoint of respect for 
cultural diversity, rather than from the “perspective of the value of 
traditional knowledge as commodities in trade.”229 
African countries that already recognize the protection of folk 
music should “be urged to adopt an . . . arrangement to regulate the 
use of folklore outside of the region.”230  While this is a good idea, 
creating a government agency to handle the integration of 
customary law recognition231 only serves to feed into the 
bureaucracy and create more red tape for traditional Africans to 
gain the protection they need and would not be an effective system 
to implement. 
The best way to approach this problem is not to force a 
Western-style scheme of protection on a customary law system 
that does not share the same values in copyright protection, but 
rather, to streamline the court system so that more cases where 
customary law is appropriate to use may be heard.  Streamlining 
the cases would require a more formal docketing system, whereby 
applicants to the court would have specific dates and times.232 
To be most effective, the system must have local branches, or 
perhaps simply individuals in each region, who might be in charge 
of keeping track of the cases in that area.  That way, the applicants 
would have less difficulty in traveling to the court for an additional 
day to file their papers; they would only have to be in the 
courtroom for the day of their hearing.  These changes would make 
the court much more accessible to a greater number of traditional 
people. 
 
 228 Gibson, supra note 50, at 16; see also id. at 27 (“A community model for the 
protection and management of traditional knowledge will be ineffectual if indeed that 
model continues the historical archiving of community, the nostalgia of ‘tradition,’ and 
the morali[z]ing of the protection and safeguarding of the traditional community as a 
global ‘public good.’”). 
 229 Id. at 17. 
 230 Kuruk, supra note 25, at 841. 
 231 See id. at 841–44. 
 232 Customary law courts are often conducted on a first-come, first-served basis, with 
no written record and few formalities. See Koyana, supra note 97, at 4. 
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Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, African statutory 
judges must receive a more comprehensive training in the 
customary law of their jurisdiction.  This is because the judges who 
know the most about the law are able to adjudicate disputes most 
fairly.233  Once Western court judges are given a deeper 
understanding of the customary law systems, they would be better 
able to adjudicate the customary law disputes with the same degree 
of precision they approach the Western disputes.234  While this 
plan would certainly be difficult to administer, and would create 
much work for the judges, the ease or difficulty of application 
should never govern the solution. 
In order to facilitate this new system, the traditional people of a 
certain area should be directed to a specific court, so that the 
judges in each particular court have the least possible amount of 
new information to absorb.  Local courts would have to be 
established.  This would serve two purposes.  Firstly, it would 
allow the people of that region to have a court sitting in their 
jurisdiction, hearing the issues occurring in that community, and 
would allow them to settle disputes without having to travel too 
far.  Secondly, it would make judges’ jobs much easier in that they 
would have to learn fewer different customary law systems.  The 
fewer systems the judges have to learn, the more intimately 
familiar they will be able to become with the systems they do 
know, which would lead to fairer and more even-handed 
adjudication of customary law disputes. 
Each country must play a vital role in this re-education of the 
judiciary; there must be standards of knowledge for customary law, 
just as there are standards for statutory and common law.  The 
customary law that would be applied in a certain situation must 
have the same force as a statute that might be applied in a similar, 
non-traditional setting; the closest scheme to this suggested one is 
 
 233 Id. 
 234 It is important to keep in mind the dualist system existing in many African countries.  
There are two separate court systems: one which is run as a Western system (what most 
readers will be familiar with) and one which is a customary law court system, presided 
over by traditional African judges practicing customary law. Id. 
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that of Nigeria.235  South Africa’s Constitution also sets a good 
example for the recognition of the legitimacy of customary law 
concurrent with statutory law236 because the South African 
Constitution has provisions for customary law and its 
implementation.237  Only in this way would customary law be on 
equal footing with statutory law in the protections that they afford 
to traditional people. 
The insider/outsider problem certainly needs addressing if a 
customary law system is to be enforceable.  It is unclear as to 
whether this problem would be best solved by statutory additions 
to customary practices or through individualized judicial 
determinations.  The fair use of insiders and protection against 
misappropriation of music by outsiders are issues that the 
legislatures and judicial systems of various African countries must 
explore further. 
CONCLUSION 
Through a discussion of the various schemes of customary and 
statutory law, this Note has highlighted the need for a shift in 
thinking.  What I propose is not a violent shift, or an unalterable 
one, but rather a solution that works with the natural flow of two 
different, yet co-existent cultures.  Perhaps if these intercultural 
protections had been in place at the time of Solomon Linda’s rise 
to fame, he would not have died in abject poverty, without the 
recognition or payment he so deserved. 
Through recognition of the differences between customary and 
statutory law, it is possible to engender respect for both schemes.  
Only through respect and mutual enforcement can these two 
systems coexist harmoniously. 
 
 235 This is because Nigerian copyright protection eschews many of the traditional 
qualities a work must have before protection is allowed.  Nigeria has a very inclusive 
scheme for protection of traditional music because it attempts to circumvent the problems 
with tangible form and ownership requirements to which many other countries rigidly 
adhere. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 236 See Mokgoro, supra note 108, at 1557; see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 211(1)–(3). 
 237 The customary law provisions are generally about customary law marriage and 
intestate succession; there is virtually no coverage of intellectual property issues. See 
Koyana, supra note 97, at 27. 
